

BBC REITH LECTURES 2011: SECURING FREEDOM
ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER
LECTURE TWO: SECURITY

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EDWARD STOURTON: Hello and welcome to the second of these Reith Lectures on the theme of securing freedom. We have of course been marking the tenth anniversary of 9/11 in recent days, and our lecturer, Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former Head of MI5, has already ruffled a few feathers with her views on the so-called War on Terror that followed that dreadful day. In her first lecture, she revealed the doubts she had about some aspects of Western policy - notably the invasion of Iraq.

This lecture, entitled Security, promises to be equally pertinent. Some of the issues Lady Manningham-Buller plans to address have been placed firmly on the front pages by the discovery of documents in Libya, which apparently link US and British intelligence services to

Colonel Gaddafi's regime.

We are meeting in the City Museum in Leeds, a fine building in a very fine city, but you can't have a discussion on this subject in this place without reflecting that this was home ground for three of the suicide bombers of Britain's own black day: 7th July 2005 when 52 innocent people were killed in London.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the BBC Reith Lecturer for 2011:
Eliza Manningham-Buller.

(audience applause)

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: For 33 years of my life I was a member of the British Security Service, popularly known as MI5. When I joined in 1974, recruitment was a bit haphazard. I met someone at a party and, with the minimum of effort, found myself, somewhat to my surprise, in the Service. I really had no idea what I was getting into, but I stayed for over half my life, because I enjoyed the work and its challenges. There were, of course, disappointments and set backs but it was a privilege to work with highly motivated colleagues on a common purpose.

And, when we had success, not always visible to the public, it was a great feeling.

The Service's remit, although not enshrined in law till late in its history when it was already 80 years old, is to protect the United Kingdom from threats including terrorism, espionage and sabotage. And to protect, explicitly, parliamentary democracy. Let me repeat - to protect parliamentary democracy. Security shouldn't damage our most important civil liberties. It is not an accident that the Service's crest incorporates a portcullis, the symbol of the British parliament.

I am often asked to speak at conferences and in debates on the theme of security versus liberty. I always refuse because I do not see these as opposites. They are different but there is no liberty without security. I wish to *argue* for liberty, not be falsely characterised as its opponent. The first human right listed in the European Convention of Human Rights is the right to life, the third the right to liberty and security. And the rights enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence are "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness". Life surely has to include safety from being a random target of terrorism.

Security is about people being able to go about their daily lives, travelling, working, enjoying themselves without being killed or mutilated. There is, of course, no such thing as 100 per cent security. Life is full of risks and no government can guarantee its citizens' safety and should not suggest it can. But we, in the UK and in the West, have an expectation of not having to live under a cloud of fear from terrorist attack. We also assume that we can speak our minds, throw out our governments, live under the rule of law with an independent judiciary and an accountable police service and we expect high standards of officials paid out of the public purse. We enjoy our civil liberties. We should not fear arbitrary arrest and if we are accused of having broken the law, we expect proper and fair legal process.

So a key role of Britain's Security Service is to protect parliamentary democracy. In the past, that has involved extensive work against totalitarian, communist and fascist regimes and their supporters. Today we may, complacently perhaps, assume that those ideologies, with their lack of freedom, are discredited and unlikely to gain strength again. But in the twentieth century they offered serious threats to our democracy.

The imaginative and courageous work against fascism in the Second World War is well-documented. Intelligence and security work - I am thinking of the operations designed to deceive Germany about the D-Day landings and the breaking of the German codes, as examples - played an important part in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Similarly, in the Cold War, crucial work was done to limit Soviet influence. When we look back on the Cold War, we wonder at the massive cost of it, the distorted perspectives and the mutual misunderstanding. But we felt threatened by a heavily-armed totalitarian regime, an "evil empire" indeed, which had colonised most of its neighbours by force and whose citizens enjoyed none of the freedoms or rights that we enjoy. Like the Nazis, with whom they had a non-aggression pact for the first two years of the Second World War, the Soviets killed vast numbers of their own citizens and governed through fear.

So why do we need organisations such as the one I feel privileged to have been a member of for over half my life? I think the answer is simple. While some threats to us are obvious, some of the most dangerous are not. In order to expose and counter such threats a state needs to acquire intelligence about them. Intelligence is information that is deliberately intended to be concealed.

To quote Lord Butler's review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, "much ingenuity and effort is spent making secret information difficult to acquire and hard to analyse".

To obtain it we have to use covert methods. We have to read, listen, look and follow secretly. We have to approach people and ask them to provide information in confidence. Those human sources who agree to provide such information usually do so for brave and principled reasons. I have met people willing to risk their own lives to save others or jeopardise their own freedom so that others may be free. They are unlikely ever to receive public recognition for the good they do. The most moving and humbling experiences of my career have been meeting such people. We all have cause to be tremendously grateful to them.

Now I was brought up to value privacy and respect it. I was taught not to eavesdrop on others' conversations, or for example, read their letters. The European Convention on Human Rights lists in Article 8 the right to a private life. However it acknowledges a few exceptions when that right is trumped, for example by the need for national security.

It felt uncomfortable - I think I was naïve - when I joined the Service to discover that the state intruded into the privacy of a few of its citizens and some of those of foreign states. But I came to see that such intrusion was justified, and could only be justified if the threat it sought to counter by such intrusion was serious. It was about necessity and proportion. Eavesdropping on plans to threaten our freedoms and our lives was a route to protecting them. It was necessary to intrude into the privacy of a few so that the majority could be safer.

What I came to appreciate was the necessity of such intrusions being properly authorised by the law. When I joined the Service there was no legislation to cover its work. We argued for security intelligence work to be properly recognised in law. The Security Service Act of 1989 was long overdue - the government of Mrs Thatcher was not, at first, convinced of its necessity - but its importance was critical. The Service's experience of working on a proper legislative basis has been wholly positive. But even at that early stage in 1989 we knew its importance.

When the Cold War ended, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe who were considering how to protect their freedom sought the advice of services like mine. Their experience of security and intelligence agencies were as repressive organs of state control, at best. Having suffered under the Gestapo, in many cases, as well as the KGB, they saw that they needed properly-constituted new security and intelligence agencies to protect their freedom. We emphasised that their agencies needed a proper legal foundation, and they took our advice.

In South Africa, too, after Mandela came to power, I remember discussing with the new ANC government how to legislate for security and intelligence agencies. I was especially struck by seeing an ANC official, in exile all his life, working alongside a white colleague from the old service. He said to me "his father tortured mine" but they were working together to create a service which could protect the new South Africa.

For many around the world, including Aung San Suu Kyi and her Burmese colleagues, the security services are in effect state-controlled terrorists, instilling fear in their people through violence or the threat of it.

But in a democracy, a properly-constituted and overseen security service, accountable to the law, with a legislative base, is, I believe, essential. In some democratic countries the functions fall to the police rather than to a separate civilian service as in the UK. I prefer our system where the Security Service has no powers of arrest or detention.

And, of course, intelligence can help in many ways. I have mentioned its strategic importance in the Second World War. It has also saved many lives in peacetime and contributed to the development of policy. How else could our government judge that the time was ripe to talk to the Provisional IRA? How else to understand and protest at the behaviour of the man described as “the father of the Pakistani bomb,” AQ Khan, who sold nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and other countries, including the criminal state of North Korea, whose people are again eating grass? How else to prevent the terrorist attack, planned for the fifth anniversary of 9/11, which, if successful, would have blown out of the air up to a dozen transatlantic aircraft, with a projected loss of life exceeding even the horrendous death toll of 9/11?

For intelligence doesn't only constrain terrorist violence; it also helps governments to understand the ideas, the aspirations and the relationships that characterise the terrorists and their supporters. It may also be factored in to the development of foreign and domestic policy but should not be the basis of it.

Intelligence work presents some complex ethical issues, well beyond the level of my parents' strictures not to listen to others' telephone calls or read their letters. As I have said, intrusion into privacy must be necessary and proportionate to the threat it aims to counter. What is proportionate and who decides? Those are crunch questions.

The important constitutional principle, enshrined in law, is that the operations of the Security Service are the responsibility of the director-general who reports to the Home Secretary. The government can not direct whom the Service investigates. This is an important safeguard against the politicisation of the Service's work. But the government *can* stop the Service deploying its more intrusive techniques, intercepting communications between people or eavesdropping on their private conversations by microphone.

These techniques have to be authorised in advance, in law, by a Secretary of State, usually the Home Secretary, who decides whether he or she agrees with the Service that the case for a warrant is strong enough to justify it. Warrants that are issued are later scrutinised by specially appointed commissioners, former senior judges, for legality and proportionality, and they report each year to the Prime Minister with the non-secret parts of their reports being laid before Parliament. The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee which, I may remind you, my Service argued for, continues to evolve its scrutiny. Because it meets in private, as it must, it is underestimated by those who seek a transparent process. Ultimately the Service is answerable to the law and the courts.

I recognise that my answer as to who decides what is proportionate will not satisfy the sceptical, but, in my experience, during my time in service, I found it sensitive about its work, with a properly narrow perspective on what it should be engaged in. At various stages in its history, for example, the Service has elected to be deaf to the suggestion by government that it should study legitimate organisations - such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

We respected the law, argued for accountability when we did not have it and fostered a culture of rigorous, sceptical, objective assessment and judgement. If you went into Thames House, the Security Service headquarters, you would find a largely young workforce of men and women from diverse backgrounds, with professional intelligence skills who, in my view rightly, believe that they are doing an important and valuable job. They are amused by the fictional presentation of what they do. The Service to which they belong will not get everything right, no organisation does, but it tries to acknowledge and learn from its mistakes.

So how, in a globalised world, with an international threat, should we work? I mentioned in my first lecture the close co-operation between intelligence and security services in Europe and with the United States who are generous providers of intelligence which has contributed significantly to our safety. We need to understand what is happening outside the UK as well as in it; al-Qaeda has extensive tentacles and many terrorist plots here have had overseas links. How can we work safely with foreign services who may have no democratic accountability and who operate in ways which would clearly be illegal in the UK?

With caution and sometimes with great difficulty, as events this week have clearly illustrated. We have to make judgements which balance the greater good against some of the evils that men do. No-one could justify what went on under Gaddafi's regime but awkward relationships are sometimes preferable to the alternative dangers of isolation and mutual enmity. The disclosures last weekend will raise widespread concern that the judgements with regard to Libya were wrong. I would like to say more but my position makes it difficult to do so. The Gibson Inquiry into the treatment of detainees after 9/11, some of which necessarily has to be held in secret to protect intelligence sources, is in my view the best place to examine these issues.

Because we have to talk to other countries but doing so carries dangers and risks. And torture. Torture is illegal in our national law and in international law. It is wrong and never justified. It is a sadness and worse that the previous government of our great ally, the United States, chose to water-board some detainees. The argument that life-saving intelligence was thereby obtained, and I accept it was, still does not justify it. Torture should be utterly rejected even when it may offer the prospect of saving lives.

I am proud my Service refused to turn to the torture of high-level German prisoners in the Second World War, when, in the early years, we stood alone and there was a high risk of our being invaded and becoming a Nazi province. So if not then, why should it be justified now?

I believe that the acquisition of short-term gain through water-boarding and other forms of mistreatment was a profound mistake and lost the United States moral authority and some of the widespread sympathy it had enjoyed as a result of 9/11. And I am confident that I know the answer to the question of whether torture has made the world a safer place. It hasn't.

In my first lecture I referred to the wealth of intelligence that flowed after 9/11 as security and intelligence agencies around the world worked desperately to prevent the next attack. In the UK we felt almost swamped, certainly inundated with leads to plots, by the rich plethora of incomplete intelligence, sometimes fragmentary, sometimes false, often contradictory, to be analysed, assessed and developed until action could be taken. The pressure was acute, the concern of the government and the public palpable.

Britain was clearly a target, as was horribly illustrated by the attacks on the British consulate and on HSBC bank headquarters in Turkey in 2003. And British nationals, who had been based and possibly trained in Afghanistan, were a major concern.

People here in the UK described as “home-grown” were of concern well before 7/7. Richard Reid, the first but not the only shoe-bomber, who tried to bring down an aircraft only months after 9/11, was British and converted to terrorism here. Staff in all the British services - my own, MI6, GCHQ and the police - were very stretched.

No sooner had we resolved one plot, than several more emerged. Indeed they proliferated, partly because of our involvement in Iraq. We had to juggle resources and make excruciating choices on what to pursue. Excessive hours were worked as we struggled to understand the scale of what we were facing. The government agreed to an unprecedented doubling of our budget, but it took some time to build up the organisation as we trained new recruits. We opened eight new regional offices, scrutinised and improved our recruitment, training, IT, intelligence methods, analytical techniques and data collection.

We also proposed a new cross-departmental terrorism assessment group, now the Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre. During the time I was director-general, our committed staff, supported by colleagues from MI6, GCHQ, other departments and the police increased the number of intelligence operations fivefold.

So was the tax-payers investment worth it? Others must judge, but I note that from 9/11 until I retired in 2007, we faced 15 serious terrorist plots and many, many smaller ones. The plots were of varying complexity and sophistication, and most involved a network of people overseas as well as people based in the UK. We detected and thwarted, with the police, a dozen of them, not a mean achievement. Three were undetected in advance: 7/7, 21/7 and Richard Reid. Richard Reid was prevented by an alert air stewardess from detonating his shoe bomb. The bombs of the four men responsible for the attempted attacks on 21/7 failed to explode and they were all arrested within 8 days. Only the four suicide bombers of 7/7 succeeded, causing the deaths of 52 innocent commuters, with many more seriously injured and maimed.

I can be grateful that we were able to protect life and prevent terror through countless operations including the most ambitious - the airline plot, planned as a spectacular terrorist attack to mark the fifth anniversary of 9/11. But I shall never forget the human tragedy of 7/7. As with 9/11, the images will not fade: the mangled bus, the victim whose burned face was covered by a paper mask, the grainy film of the bombers, both on their reconnaissance and on the final, fateful day, the dignity of the bereaved at the inquest.

I wish so much that it had been possible to stop it, but the Service expects to be judged by what we did not prevent, not what we did. It was a grim day and I can vividly recall the sickening feeling when we thought we had a repeat on 21/7. I can remember my acute apprehension that this might be a pattern and that the resilience and determination of Londoners not to be cowed and to come to work as usual might be gradually eroded and that fear might prevail. And, speaking as I am in Leeds, I recognise the particular shock and horror for people here that three of those responsible for 7/7 lived near here. The Security Service has always believed that the best result of a counter-terrorist operation is a successful prosecution. We live under the rule of law and are grateful for that.

Prosecution can cause difficulties but they can generally be overcome.

The first difficulty is the decision, the responsibility of the police, on *when* to arrest. Too soon, the evidence is inadequate, no-one can be charged and there will be media criticism. Too late and the attack has occurred and the authorities are severely criticised for foreknowledge.

Secondly, not all intelligence can be turned into evidence. It can fall well short. As I have said before, of evidential standards, hearsay at third hand, things said, things overheard, things seen and open to varying interpretation, rarely clear-cut even with the benefit of hindsight, sometimes designed to mislead, all needing validation, analysis and assessment, and which any judge would unhesitatingly kick out even if the prosecution thought them useable. That requires us to accept that not everyone who presents a threat can be prosecuted.

And thirdly, sources of intelligence are fragile. Individuals who supply it often risk torture and death. They put their trust in us. Our duty is to protect them and their human rights. Techniques can be compromised and become unusable.

If we compromise intelligence sources and risk the lives of those who bravely give us information, we shall soon have no intelligence and the risks to our lives and our liberty will rocket.

Those who argue for a world without secrets would be less safe if their wishes were met. But this, and this is an important but, we must still seek prosecutions as we do not resort to off-shore internment as the Bush administration did. I am proud that some 240 individuals have been subject to proper legal process and convicted of terrorist-related offences since 9/11. That is the way to deal with terrorist crime. But for long term success, and a reduction in the threat, politics and especially foreign policy, have to play their crucial parts. And that will be the subject of my next lecture.

(audience applause)

EDWARD STOURTON: Well, goodness, what a lot there is to talk about there. Thank you very much indeed for that, Eliza Manningham-Buller. We've got a very diverse audience here in the City Museum in Leeds. Let me open it up to your more general discussion and call some questions. Who'd like to kick things off?

DUNCAN GARDHAM: It's Duncan Gardham. I'm the security correspondent at the Daily Telegraph. Quite often when people think about security services, their minds go to the water-boarding that took place after 9/11 and I know you feel quite strongly, as you've said today, that that was wrong. But I'm interested in whether several high-up American people have said that intelligence that saved British lives came from the water-boarding of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 9/11 architect, and in particular two plots: one at Canary Wharf and the other the dirty bomb plot. I wondered whether you agreed with that?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: It's not the case that torture always produces false information, and that actually it's clear that torture *can* contribute to saving lives. But I don't think that's the point. I think the point is that it's not something that is right, legal or moral to do.

EDWARD STOURTON: It's a fascinating position, that, because most people who don't like torture say it doesn't work. You say it does work, but it still shouldn't be done.

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I do say that. I don't agree with all the claims that the American people to whom you're referring make. I think some of those statements are

exaggerated, but I don't want to get into specifics.

EDWARD STOURTON: Young man in the second row there.

ROWAN ARTHUR: Rowan Arthur, pupil at Bradford Grammar School. I find it interesting that when you talk about the sort of right to privacy and that sort of freedom, you say that it's in a cost-benefit analysis okay to invade that if we get significant results from it and we help other people's freedom; but when you're talking about freedom in terms of torture - that sort of right, that sort of freedom - it's not acceptable in any case. And I'm interested to know why we put that particular area of freedom above the other?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: It's a question I think of what you believe of the law. Now if you believe in the rule of law, one of those options is illegal; one isn't. But more seriously, it's to do with, is it not, ethical standards? Surely there is a world of difference between listening to somebody's telephone conversation or listening to a microphone of them discussing something, to actually compromising our own integrity and decency as human beings by subjecting them to that sort of treatment?

I think there's another point as well though. You might get short-term gain, but for every piece of information you might get from doing it, you radicalise, disenchant, disgust, turn to terrorism a lot of other people. If you like, it's not unlike internment in Northern Ireland, which served to bring into terrorism a whole new generation of young Irish men and women because they saw something that was done without the rule of law.

EDWARD STOURTON: Another question. Yes?

PETER TAYLOR: Peter Taylor, BBC. I'd just like to ask your reaction to some of the intelligence documents which have been revealed and seized in Libya - in particular with regard to British involvement in apparent rendition of Islamist suspects. I'm referring in particular to the case of Abu Munthir and a CIA cable to the Libyan intelligence authorities that said we, the CIA, are aware that your service - that's Libyan intelligence - had been cooperating with the British to effect Abu Munthir's removal to Tripoli. Abu Munthir was a leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. That cable would seem to indicate that, despite denials by successive British governments, that we appear to have been involved in illegal rendition. What's your reaction to that?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I'd like to answer your question, Peter. There's two reasons why I can't. The first one is that I expect to give evidence to the Gibson Inquiry and I will expect him to cover these issues. The second is that I retired from the Security Service four and a half years ago. I would need to remind myself of what papers I was aware of then; I need to read the documents that might be relevant. If I were to give you a personal reaction now or indeed a comment, I might need subsequently to retract it because I need to look at the papers and I expect to have to do that.

EDWARD STOURTON: Can I just follow that up in a slightly roundabout way? You're absolutely clear in your lecture about what you think about things like torture. The documents suggest that some of this sort of activity went on. Most of them talk about MI6, not your service. If we were to speculate that there might have been rather different attitudes on this question between MI5 and MI6, would we be pursuing a fruitful path?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: It's a very clever and speculative question to which I'm not going to reply.
(audience laughter)

EDWARD STOURTON: Fair enough. I'm going to take a question from down here.

RICHARD NORTON-TAYLOR: Richard Norton-Taylor from the Guardian. Should MI5 have done more to pursue two of the 7/7 suicide bombers more rigorously because they were seen by MI5 officers and heard by MI5 officers more than once a year before?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: It's obviously a regret that we didn't stop that attack, and I think in the Service we all worried and wondered what more we could have done and we probably should have done some things differently. But there's been a pretty extensive scrutiny of our performance, or failures in it. First by the Intelligence and Security Committee who wrote an extraordinarily detailed report; secondly by the inquest. And in the inquest and in the ISC, the Intelligence Security Committee Report, some criticisms of us were made. And I know that my former colleagues accept those criticisms, but in neither case was the judgement that we could have prevented it.

EDWARD STOURTON: Question here.

DAVID DAVIS: David Davis, Member of Parliament. We're the only serious country in the world not to allow the use of intercept evidence in court. Probably as a result of that, our convictions for terrorism in the last decade since 9/11 are less than 10 per cent of the Americans. Do you think this is wise?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: My Service in 1988 suggested to government that we should use telephone intercept in court, but the reason it didn't happen then is because successive governments have looked at this in detail and found it procedurally very difficult. I hope that it will become possible.

EDWARD STOURTON: So just to be clear, when governments, politicians say to us well the intelligence services wouldn't wear it - it's not true; it's governments that won't wear it?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: There's three intelligence services.

EDWARD STOURTON: *(laughter)* Alright. Just there.

BEATRICE PICKUP: Hello. Beatrice Pickup, trainee journalist at Leeds Trinity. You spoke of a distorted perspective in the Cold War. To what extent would you say that perspective was distorted after 9/11, and would you say that it still is now?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I don't forget and I doubt if any of you here will forget what it felt like after 9/11. It really changed the world. What was going to happen next? It was like my grandchildren playing sort of Star Wars on their computers where there were plots coming like this at us. I think it's probable that we did get some wrong perspectives then, but I understand why it happened. And ten years on, I think it's easier to see the great significance of that event, but we are calmer and more rational about it.

EDWARD STOURTON: Do you think we are back on more of an even keel? You clearly think that the Americans got a wrong perspective because you told us in your lecture what you think about water-boarding and so forth, but do you think that's righted itself now?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I hope so.

EDWARD STOURTON: *(to audience member)* Yes?

ALYAS KARMANI Street Project. We work with individuals who have been convicted under the Terrorist Act. You mentioned about not damaging civil liberties and you also mentioned about not being politicised in terms of your process as well. Many would say that there's been in the last ten years a disproportionate curtailing of civil liberties of the Muslim community, and that many of the arrests under the Terrorist Act 2006 were politically motivated and that many individuals were arrested who really didn't have intent or capability to commit terrorist acts. Do you think if we're going to move onto the next decade that we need a more measured approach and we need to do some kind of review in terms of those particular arrests and convictions as well?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I don't know whether we need to review established convictions. I'm sorry you feel that some of that action was wrong and unfair. I would hope that British justice would remedy the cases that fell into that category.

EDWARD STOURTON: Have you changed your recruitment policy - no longer you - but so there are more Muslims sought for the Service?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: We couldn't have had the success we have had without Muslim members of staff, with their understanding of these issues, with their language skills, with their wish as British citizens to participate in the protection of their own communities as well as any others. And, equally, we couldn't have had the success we've had without members of Muslim communities providing us information in confidence. So many of the attacks in the United Kingdom that have been stopped, we give thanks to Muslim Britons for helping us stop them. When I left, something like 14 per cent of people recruited came from ethnic minorities, and I believe that that continues to be a roughly similar figure.

EDWARD STOURTON: The lady just in front.

ADEEBA MALIK: Hello. Adeeba Malik, QED UK - a national organisation charity based in Bradford. Those British Muslim communities that we have been working with up and down the country actually feel they've got a raw deal in terms of finding work, in terms of being stereotyped, in terms of being stopped at airports. What do you suggest needs to happen to reassure those communities, those people who say they are Muslim but also British, to actually feel that they are part of British

society?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I don't think I have the answer to your question. I do repeat though that when people are victimising or pre-judging the contribution of Muslims in this area, they often make presumptions about the contribution the citizens from those communities make, which are wrong, because in my experience citizens from those communities can be very helpful indeed.

EDWARD STOURTON: A couple of questions at the back there. Gentleman first.

LUCAS CURRY: My name is Lucas Curry. I work for local government. There's been a lot of speculation in the press about why young people took to the streets and looted various shops. I just wondered what you thought were some of the root causes behind the people who take radical actions and join these extremist groups - what you personally thought was the motivation.

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: The motives for being involved in terrorism will vary, but I think that for many who were attracted to what al-Qaeda promotes, it was a view that Muslims were under attack by the West, that it was the

duty of their co-religionists to defend those people and seek to avenge their deaths. If you look at the video wills, it's pretty explicit why those individuals chose to do it, but motives will vary.

EDWARD STOURTON: Right to the back. Gentleman just in front of the pillar back there.

HOWARD FOSTER: Howard Foster. I'm an investigative journalist. What do you feel are the abiding worries for your successors now? What areas are the ones we need to be aware of?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Luckily my successor doesn't burden me with the things he's worrying about. So if I were to answer your question, it would be by guessing.

EDWARD STOURTON: Do you not have some thoughts on where we are? You made the point about the Cold War giving way to the sort of threats that we now have. Are we still essentially in the same period that we've been in since 9/11 or do you see other things on the horizon?

MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Well one of the things in the service we did try to do was to look for what was coming

over the horizon. I can't say that our record in doing it was very good because by definition you don't know what's come over the horizon till it gets there, but we did try to do that and we did try to worry about other things that might become the sort of national security threat to which our techniques were applicable which we could do within the law if we had the resources to do. But in practice during my time as director-general, we could do very little beyond terrorism and a bit on espionage.

EDWARD STOURTON: There are a forest of hands and I apologise to those people who haven't been able to ask questions, but we're going to have to call a halt there. Eliza Manningham-Buller, thank you very much, and thanks to all of you here at Leeds City Museum. Next week we're in London where she'll be discussing policy priorities ten years on from 9/11. I'm Edward Stourton and the producers were Jim Frank and Mark Savage. Until then, goodbye.

(applause)